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THE IRRELEVANCE OF JURISDICTIONALITY IN FORT BEND 







For the last fifteen years or so, the Supreme Court has fixated on 
questions involving the characterization of rules and statutes as 
“jurisdictional.” The quest began in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better 
Environment, when the Court noted that jurisdiction “is a word of many, 
too many, meanings.”1 Subsequent opinions have brought new attention and 
thinking to questions of jurisdiction.2 The Court’s focus has undoubtedly 
                                                 
* Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr. Distinguished Professor of Law and Associate Dean for 
Research, UC Hastings College of the Law. This article is excerpted and adapted from an 
amicus brief I filed in Fort Bend County v. Davis. 
1 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998) (quotation cleaned up). 
2 See, e.g., Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chi., 138 S. Ct. 13 (2017); United 
States v. Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625 (2015); Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. 145 
(2013); Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134 (2012); Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428 
(2011); Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010); John R. Sand & Gravel Co. 
v. United States, 552 U.S. 130 (2008); Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007); Arbaugh 
v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006); Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12 (2005) (per 
curiam); Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401 (2004); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443 
(2004). 
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had a salutary effect, especially in erecting a clearer framework for deciding 
such jurisdictional-characterization questions.3 
This laser-like focus on jurisdictionality, however, has had the 
unfortunate, ancillary effect of distracting from important questions about 
the particular effects of a rule or statute.4 In some cases, the question of 
effects is actually the real question of relevance to the case, while the 
jurisdictional-characterization question fades to irrelevancy. A recent case, 
Fort Bend County v. Davis, illustrates why. 
 
I. FORT BEND COUNTY FACTS 
 
Lois Davis worked for Fort Bend County, Texas.5 She filed a complaint 
with the county’s human-resources department alleging that the director of 
her department sexually harassed and assaulted her. Although the director 
resigned in the aftermath of the investigation, her direct supervisor, she 
alleged, who was the director’s friend, began retaliating against her. One 
day, she informed her supervisor that she could not work on a particular 
Sunday because of a “previous religious commitment.” When she did not 
show up that Sunday, she was fired. 
Title VII requires prospective plaintiffs to exhaust their employment-
discrimination claims with the EEOC or coordinate state agency prior to 
filing a lawsuit in federal court.6 The exhaustion requirement is designed to 
trigger administrative investigation and conciliatory procedures with an eye 
toward non-judicial resolution.7 Accordingly, Davis filed an intake 
questionnaire and a formal charge with the Texas Workforce Commission, 
which is the state agency charged with enforcing federal and state 
employment-discrimination laws.  
                                                 
3 See Scott Dodson, Jurisdiction and Its Effects, 105 GEO. L.J. 619, 621 (2017); Scott 
Dodson, A Revolution in Jurisdiction, in THE LEGACY OF RUTH BADER GINSBURG 137 
(Scott Dodson ed. 2015). 
4 Elsewhere, I have argued that the Court’s attempt to divine Congress’s intent in 
characterizing a rule or statute as jurisdictional is itself misplaced because the term 
“jurisdictional” is definitional rather than positivist. See Scott Dodson, Defending 
Jurisdiction, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. ONLINE 85, 90-94 (2018). 
5 The facts in this section come from the Court of Appeals’ opinion in Davis v. Fort 
Bend Cnty., 893 F.3d 300 (5th Cir. 2018). 
6 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). 
7 See Pacheco v. Mineta, 448 F.3d 783, 788-89 (5th Cir. 2006). 
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In her charge and questionnaire, she alleged sexual harassment and 
retaliation based on the incidents with the director and her supervisor. While 
her charge was still pending, she amended her intake questionnaire to add 
the word “religion” in the box for “Employment Harms or Actions.” She 
did not amend her formal charge. After investigation, the Commission 
issued her a right-to-sue letter. 
Davis then filed suit in federal district court asserting claims of both 
retaliation and religious discrimination under Title VII. Fort Bend County 
filed an answer but did not assert any defense based on exhaustion or 
challenge exhaustion in any way. After discovery, Fort Bend County moved 
for summary judgment on the merits, without mentioning exhaustion, and 
the district court granted its motion. On appeal, Fort Bend County defended 
the district court’s order solely on the ground that it was correct on the 
merits. The Fifth Circuit reversed as to the religious-discrimination claim 
and remanded for trial.  
On remand, instead of proceeding to trial, Fort Bend County moved to 
dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and argued, for the first time, 
that Davis failed to exhaust her religious-discrimination claim and that that 
failure was a jurisdictional defect that required dismissal. The district court 
agreed and dismissed.  
Davis again appealed, and the Fifth Circuit reversed. The Fifth Circuit 
held that the exhaustion requirement was not jurisdictional and that Fort 
Bend County had forfeited the opportunity to raise it. Accordingly, the Fifth 
Circuit remanded for trial.8 Fort Bend County sought certiorari on the 
question whether the exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional, and the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari on that question. In the Court, all parties 
and all amici (save one) focused on the jurisdictional-characterization 
question. 
 
II. THE IRRELEVANCE OF JURISDICTIONALITY 
 
Unfortunately, resolving this jurisdictional issue will not necessarily 
resolve the issue confronting the parties. The precise issue confronting the 
parties is whether the district court erred in dismissing Davis’s claim for 
failure to exhaust when Fort Bend County did not timely assert an 
                                                 
8 Davis, 893 F.3d at 306-08. 
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exhaustion defense. That issue can and should be resolved directly by resort 
to statutory construction, common-law traditions, and administrative 
policy. As I explain below, that issue should not—and perhaps cannot—be 
resolved by determining the exhaustion requirement’s jurisdictional 
character. 
In some of the Court’s jurisdictional-characterization cases, the Court 
has taken a jurisdiction-first approach of deciding the jurisdictional 
character of a rule in order to define its effects. In Bowles v. Russell, for 
example, the Court held that the deadline to file a notice of appeal in a civil 
case is jurisdictional and therefore not subject to equitable exceptions.9 The 
Court engaged no separate analysis of the deadline’s effects; the 
jurisdictional holding automatically led to the determination that equitable 
exceptions were not allowed. 
This jurisdiction-first approach assumes that jurisdictional rules have 
immutable and defined characteristics, namely, that they are not subject to 
principles of equity, discretion, estoppel, forfeiture, consent, or waiver, and 
courts must police them sua sponte at all times prior to final judgment. The 
jurisdiction-first approach also assumes that nonjurisdictional rules have (at 
least presumptively) the inverse effects of jurisdiction.10 These assumptions 
underlying the jurisdiction-first approach are flawed. In truth, the 
jurisdictional characterization of a rule does not inexorably define its 
effects. 
The flaw is easier to appreciate with nonjurisdictional rules. 
Nonjurisdictional rules can have effects typically associated with 
jurisdictional rules, such as being nonwaivable or unsusceptible to equitable 
exceptions.11 Indeed, although exhaustion requirements are often treated as 
nonjurisdictional preconditions to suit, those exhaustion requirements 
nevertheless often exhibit jurisdiction-like effects.12 The point is that 
                                                 
9 Bowles, 551 U.S. at 212-14. 
10 See, e.g., Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 205 (2006) (“A statute of limitations 
defense . . . is not ‘jurisdictional,’ hence courts are under no obligation to raise the time bar 
sua sponte.”) (original emphasis); id. at 213 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that ordinary 
time-bar defenses “are nonjurisdictional and thus subject to waiver and forfeiture”). 
11 See Scott Dodson, Mandatory Rules, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1, 6 (2008). 
12 See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684 (1984) (“We agree with the 
Court of Appeals that the [habeas] exhaustion rule requiring dismissal of mixed petitions, 
though to be strictly enforced, is not jurisdictional.”); Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 
133 (1987) (holding that appellate courts have discretion to consider a habeas petitioner’s 
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nonjurisdictional rules—including nonjurisdictional exhaustion 
requirements—can have jurisdiction-like effects that might make them 
nonforfeitable or mandatory.13 
Although harder to appreciate, the flip side is true as well: jurisdictional 
rules can have nonjurisdictional effects, in myriad ways.14 Most pertinent 
to Fort Bend County is the species of “jurisdictional preconditions,” in 
which an event or action is required to confer jurisdiction. Though such a 
precondition is a predicate to jurisdiction, the precondition itself need not 
be unwaivable or incurable or inexcusable.15 For example, while appellate 
jurisdiction in a civil case requires a timely notice of appeal,16 what 
constitutes an effective “notice” is subject to judicial discretion.17 Similarly, 
while appellate jurisdiction in a habeas case requires the issuance of a 
certificate of appealability,18 certain defects in the certificate can be cured 
or forfeited.19 
As for exhaustion requirements, the Court has characterized some as 
prerequisites to jurisdiction, but not always with all of the usual attributes 
of jurisdictionality. For example, the statutory requirement that social-
security claimants receive a final decision from the Social Security 
Commissioner before filing a claim in federal court20 is a “jurisdictional 
prerequisite” that contains “a waivable element [that] the administrative 
                                                 
failure to exhaust even if the State did not assert the defense); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3) 
(providing that the habeas exhaustion requirement cannot be forfeited by the State); Jones 
v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211-16 (2007) (holding the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement to be 
mandatory but an affirmative defense that must be asserted in the answer). 
13 E.g., Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert, No. 17-1094, slip op. at 4 (2019) (“Whether a 
rule precludes equitable tolling turns not on its jurisdictional character but rather on 
whether the text of the rule leaves room for such flexibility.”). 
14 See Scott Dodson, Hybridizing Jurisdiction, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1437 (2011). 
15 Id. at 1463-65. 
16 See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007). 
17 See Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U.S. 757, 765 (2001) (allowing an appellant to 
correct a defective notice of appeal); Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 245 (1992) (treating an 
appellate brief as a notice of appeal); Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181 (1962) (deeming 
a notice of appeal from the denial of a motion to vacate to be a notice of appeal from the 
underlying judgment). 
18 See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003). 
19 See Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 143-45 (2012) (“A defective COA is not 
equivalent to the lack of any COA.”). 
20 See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 
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remedies provided by the [Commissioner] be exhausted.”21 A claimant’s 
failure to comply with this waivable part of the exhaustion requirement is 
also excusable by the courts even absent the Commissioner’s waiver.22 
The teaching of these cases is that the jurisdictional characterization of 
an exhaustion requirement does not conclusively determine whether an 
exhaustion defect can be cured by a party, forfeited by the other party, or 
enforced by a district court despite party forfeiture. 
For that reason, resolving the jurisdictional character of Title VII’s 
exhaustion requirement in Fort Bend County cannot itself resolve whether 
the district court correctly dismissed Davis’s unexhausted claim. If the 
exhaustion requirement is a jurisdictional precondition, it might still be 
forfeitable or excusable or curable. If the exhaustion requirement is 
nonjurisdictional, it might still be mandatory or enforceable despite the 
circumstances. Resolving the jurisdictional issue simply does not answer 
the real question confronting the parties: whether the district court was 
correct to dismiss for failure to exhaust. 
 
III. A BETTER WAY FORWARD 
 
Rather than take a jurisdiction-first approach, the Court should take an 
effects-based approach that avoids the jurisdictional issue and instead 
construes the effects of the rule directly. The Court has taken such an 
approach before. In Hallstrom v. Tillamook County,23 the Court was 
presented with the question of whether RCRA’s 60-day notice requirement 
was a limit on federal subject-matter jurisdiction. However, the Court 
declined to answer that question and instead answered the narrow question 
presented by the facts of the case: whether the requirement was amenable 
to equitable exceptions.24 The Court answered that question directly without 
addressing the jurisdictional character of the notice requirement. 
Likewise, the petition for certiorari in John R. Sand asked this Court to 
decide “[w]hether the statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2501 limits the 
                                                 
21 See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 327-30 (1976); see also Heckler v. Day, 
467 U.S. 104, 110 n.14 (1984) (“The jurisdictional requirement that administrative 
remedies be exhausted is waivable.”). 
22 See Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 484-86 (1986). 
23 493 U.S. 20 (1989). 
24 Id. at 31. 
VOLUME: 1                                            SPRING 2019                                                  ISSUE: 1 
22 
 
subject matter jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims.”25 The precise 
issue in that case, however, was whether a court must enforce the limitations 
period even if the United States, as a party-defendant, waives the issue. In 
its opinion, the Court rephrased the question presented to reflect these terms 
and resolved that issue alone.26 In the process, this Court carefully avoided 
characterizing the limitations period as jurisdictional or nonjurisdictional.27 
The Court should take the approach of Hallstrom and John R. Sand in 
deciding Fort Bend County. That effects-based approach, unlike a 
jurisdiction-first approach, will answer the narrow and precise question 
actually at hand: did the district court err in dismissing Davis’s complaint 
for lack of exhaustion despite Fort Bend County’s failure to timely raise the 
exhaustion issue? 
I do not urge a particular answer to that question. Perhaps the 
importance of Title VII exhaustion justifies the district court’s dismissal 
despite Fort Bend County’s forfeiture or any considerations of equity. 
Perhaps the preference for party autonomy means that Fort Bend County’s 
forfeiture disables the district court from dismissing for lack of exhaustion. 
Perhaps Davis’s exhaustion of her related sexual-harassment and retaliation 
claims should, under the circumstances, be deemed effective exhaustion of 
her religious-discrimination claim. Perhaps the district court should have 
exercised discretion to stay the case to allow Davis an opportunity to 
exhaust the religious-discrimination claim.  
The right answer will depend upon ordinary principles of statutory 
construction, common-law traditions, and administrative policy. It need 





                                                 
25 Pet. Br. at i, John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, No. 06-1164, 2007 WL 
2236607 (Aug. 3, 2017). 
26 John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 132 (2008). 
27 Id. at 133-35 (characterizing the time bar as a “more absolute” bar that justifies 
departure from usual waiver rules); cf. id. at 134 (suggesting that prior cases’ use of the 
term “jurisdictional” was “[a]s convenient shorthand”). 
